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Abstract
Interactive realizability is a computational semantics of classical Arithmetic. It is based on
interactive learning and was originally designed to interpret excluded middle and Skolem axioms
for simple existential formulas. A realizer represents a proof/construction depending on some
state, which is an approximation of some Skolem functions. The realizer interacts with the
environment, which may provide a counter-proof, a counterexample invalidating the current
construction of the realizer. But the realizer is always able to turn such a negative outcome
into a positive information, which consists in some new piece of knowledge learned about the
mentioned Skolem functions. The aim of this work is to extend Interactive realizability to a
system which includes classical first-order Peano Arithmetic with Skolem axioms. For witness
extraction, the learning capabilities of realizers will be exploited according to the paradigm of
learning by levels. In particular, realizers of atomic formulas will be update procedures in the
sense of Avigad and thus will be understood as stratified-learning algorithms.
1998 ACM Subject Classification F.4.1
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1 Introduction
Do classical proofs have some constructive content? If yes, what is a construction in classical
logic? On a first thought one is inclined to think that these questions cannot have any
interesting answers in terms of effective computer programs.
Surely, a classical proof is a mental construction, for it is a succession of constructive
steps interleaved with some ineffective considerations, which however appear to have a clear
mental constructive significance. Indeed, when we use the excluded middle, we can clearly
picture ourselves ideally deciding whether in a situation something holds or does not. When
we use an axiom of comprehension, we employ a definite law in order to construct in our
minds a perfectly determined collection of elements. When we use the axiom of choice, we
may imagine ourselves to make arbitrary choices as long as it is needed.
Even if a classical proof seems a legitimate mental construction, it is still a long way to
yield some effective computer program. Nevertheless, from the beginning of proof theory
many results have been obtained in that direction, which clearly showed that classical proofs
have a constructive content. Of course, we refer to the seminal results obtained by Hilbert’s
epsilon substitution method (see e.g [17]) and Gentzen’s cut elimination [13]. Then, several
other techniques have been introduced: among them, Gödel’s double negation translation
followed either by the Gödel functional interpretation [12] or Kreisel’s modified realizability
[15] and Friedman’s translation [11]; finally, Curry-Howard correspondence (see e.g. [18]).
The Curry-Howard correspondence, first introduced for intuitionistic logic and finally
extended to higher-order classical logic [16], clearly shows that a classical proof not only is a
mental construction but has the very same syntactic structure of a program. In other words,
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a proof is an effective program. Thus the problem of explaining what is a construction in
classical logic acquires a perfectly sound mathematical sense.
Though all these constructive interpretations may seem very different from each other, a
deeper study shows that they are all based on the same concept: learning. As suggestively
showed by Coquand [10], a classical proof yields a learning strategy in some class of games
in which players can erase their moves and backtrack to earlier positions of the game.
Now, the most important problem to solve in order to understand and implement effi-
ciently the constructive content of classical proofs, is to provide an accurate description of
the nature and the structure of the knowledge that a program extracted from a classical
proof gathers during its execution. Only after a precise description of learning has been
completed, one can think of how to build efficient programs. This remains a complex task,
but it is of central importance to start by defining a semantics for classical proofs explicitly
based on learning. In such a way, one can implement a much more sophisticated backtrack-
ing mechanism which minimizes the information that is lost when a program abandons its
current evaluation context in order to restore a previous one. This loss of information is
indeed the biggest source of inefficiency for programs extracted from classical proofs.
In order to provide answers to those issues, Interactive realizability [1, 4, 6] has been
developed: it is a realizability semantics based on states of knowledge and learning, designed
for a system of Heyting Arithmetic with excluded middle and choice principles (Skolem
axioms) restricted to Σ01-formulas. In hindsight, it can be seen as modern evolution of the
epsilon substitution method, refined and rebuilt around the Curry-Howard correspondence
for classical logic and game semantics. The aim of this paper is to take the theory of
Interactive realizability to the next level: we extend it in order to interpret a full classical
system, which includes first-order Peano Arithmetic with Skolem axioms, that is, excluded
middle, comprehension and choice over all first-order formulas.
The theory of Interactive realizability makes precise the intuitive considerations that
we have made above. In particular, it explains how to interpret a classical proof, how to
pass from the ideal mental construction it represents to a concrete effective construction (a
program). The main concepts are indeed the following:
TClass and mental constructions. An interactive realizer is in the first place a term of
TClass, a version of Gödel’s system T enriched with Skolem function symbols for every
arithmetical formulas. The terms of TClass represent the mental constructions that one
can obtain directly and intuitively from a classical proof.
States of Knowledge as Approximations. Terms of TClass are ineffective and, let to them-
selves, useless. Therefore, interactive realizers are always computed with respect to
states, i.e. approximations of the Skolem functions they contain and thus effectiveness is
recovered.
Learning. Since finite approximations may be inadequate, results of computations may
be wrong. But an interactive realizer is also a self-correcting program, able to spot
incorrect values of the approximations used during computations and to correct them
with right values. The new values are learned, remarkably, by realizers of classical prin-
ciples and all the oracle values needed during each particular computation are acquired
through learning processes. Here is the fundamental insight: classical principles may be
computationally interpreted as learning devices.
All these ideas work very smoothly for the most simple instance of the excluded middle
EM1 := ∀x
N. ∃yNP (x, y) ∨ ∀yN¬P (x, y) (P computable atomic predicate)
A realizer of this principle uses some approximation s of a Skolem function Φ for P in
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order to decide which side of EM1 is true. If for some particular n, P (n, s(n)) holds, then
the realizer has a witness for the left side; otherwise, it declares the right side to be true.
However, if the environment asks the realizer for a construction of ¬P (n,m) and actually
m is a counterexample to its belief (i.e. P (n,m) is true), then the realizer corrects the
approximation s as to output m on input n. We observe that this correction is sound on
absolute grounds: m is a correct value for Φ on argument n.
In the case of a general instance of the excluded middle
EM := ∀xN. ∃yNA(x, y) ∨ ∀yN¬A(x, y) (A first-order formula)
one stumbles across a serious problem: even if one has an approximation s of a Skolem
function Φ for A(x, y), how to compute whether A(n, s(n)) holds? In general, one cannot
know for sure the truth value of a complex formula. A realizer thus may assume that
s(n) is not a witness and declare the right side to be true. However, a problem remains
because learning is going to be by counterexamples: how to test whether an m given by
a computational environment is such that A(n,m) is true? The solution is to “compute”
the truth value of A(n,m) by using the approximations of the Skolem functions for the sub-
formulas of A: for eliminating quantifiers, it suffices to use the equivalences ∃y B(x, y) ≡
B(x,ψ(x)), where ψ is a Skolem function for B. Since these approximations refer to Skolem
functions for formulas of lower logical complexity than that of A, a realizer can determine
on relatively firm grounds whether m is a correct value for Φ on argument n.
An important concept that we shall introduce is therefore that of truth value of a formula
in a state and we shall study how it relates to realizability. Another novelty is that the self-
corrections of realizers will not be absolute, but relative, and learning will be by levels. By
this we mean that whenever a realizer gains some knowledge concerning a Skolem function
for some formula, it may falsify a knowledge about another Skolem function for a formula of
higher complexity than the first. In this case, one is forced to remove the falsified knowledge
and all its consequences of greater level from the current state. The termination of this add-
and-remove process is not at all evident, yet it may be proved by well-established techniques:
we shall be able to see that a realizer of an atomic formula is an update procedure in the
sense of Avigad [7], and that will be enough for witness extraction. As in [4], one can
see Interactive realizability as new use of Friedman’s translation and modified realizability,
that allows to extract update procedures from classical proofs without transforming them
in quantifier-free form, as in the epsilon substitution method or Herbrand analysis.
Plan of the Paper. In section §2 we introduce the term calculus TClass in which Interactive,
learning-based realizers are written, namely an extension of Gödel’s system T plus Skolem
function symbols for a denumerable collection of Skolem functions. In section §3, we extend
Interactive realizability, as described in [1, 4], to HAω + EM + SK, an arithmetical system
with functional variables which includes first-order classical Peano Arithmetic and Skolem ax-
ioms. In section §4 we show how to perform witness extraction with Interactive realizability.
Acknowledgments. I would like to thank Stefano Berardi for his valuable comments
and suggestions on early drafts of this paper.
2 The Term Calculus TClass
In this section we follow the approach of [1, 4] and describe the typed lambda calculi T and
TClass in which interactive realizers are written. T is an extension of Gödel’s system T (see
Girard [14]) with some syntactic sugar. The basic objects of T are numerals, booleans, and
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its basic computational constructs are primitive recursion at all types, if-then-else, pairs, as
in Gödel’s T. T also includes as basic objects finite functions over N and simple primitive
recursive operations over them. TClass is obtained from T by adding on top of it a collec-
tion of Skolem function symbols Φ0,Φ1,Φ2 . . . , of type N → N, one for each arithmetical
formula. The symbols are inert from the computational point of view and realizers are
always computed with respect to some approximation of the Skolem maps represented by
Φ0,Φ1, . . ..
2.1 Updates
In order to define T , we start by introducing the concept of “update”, which is nothing
but a finite function over N (i.e. a map over N with finite domain). Realizers of atomic
formulas will return these finite functions, or “updates”, as new pieces of information that
they have learned about the Skolem function Φ0,Φ1, . . .. Skolem functions, in turn, are
used as “oracles” during computations in the system TClass. Updates are new associations
input-output that are intended to correct, and in this sense, to update, wrong oracle values
used in a computation.
 Definition 1 (Updates and Consistent Union). We define:
1. An update set U , shortly an update, is a finite set of triples of natural numbers repres-
enting a finite function from N2 to N.
2. Two triples (a, n,m) and (a′, n′,m′) of numbers are consistent if a = a′ and n = n′
implies m = m′. Two updates U1, U2 are consistent if U1 ∪ U2 is an update.
3. U is the set of all updates.
4. The consistent union U1 U U2 of U1, U2 ∈ U is U1 ∪ U2 minus all triples of U2 which are
inconsistent with some triple of U1.
The consistent union U1 U U2 is an non-commutative operation: whenever a triple of U1
and a triple of U2 are inconsistent, we arbitrarily keep the triple of U1 and we reject the triple
of U2, therefore for some U1, U2 we have U1 U U2 6= U2 U U1. The operator U represents a
way of selecting a consistent subset of U1 ∪ U2, such that U1UU2 = ∅ =⇒ U1 = U2 = ∅.
Any operator U with that property would produce an alternative Realizability Semantics.
2.2 The System T
T is formally described in figure 1. Terms of the form ifA t1 t2 t3 will be written in the more
legible form if t1 then t2 else t3. A numeral is a term of the form S(. . .S(0) . . .). For every
update U ∈ U, there is in T a constant U : U, where U is a new base type representing U.
We write ∅ for ∅. In T , there are four operations involving updates (see figure 1):
1. The first operation is denoted by the constant min : U → N. min takes as argument an
update constant U ; it returns the minimum numeral a such that (a, n,m) ∈ U for some
n,m ∈ N, if any exists; it returns 0 otherwise.
2. The second operation is denoted by the constant get : U → N3 → N. get takes as argu-
ments an update constant U and three numerals a, n, l; it returns m if (a, n,m) ∈ U for
some m ∈ N (i.e. if (a, n) belongs to the domain of the partial function U); it returns l
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otherwise.
3. The third operation is denoted by the constant mkupd : N3 → U. mkupd takes as argu-
ments three numerals a, n,m and transforms them into (the constant coding in T ) the
update {(a, n,m)}.
4. The fourth operation is denoted by the constant ⋒ : U2 → U. ⋒ takes as arguments two
update constants and returns the update constant denoting their consistent union.
We observe that the constants min, get,mkupd are just syntactic sugar and may be
avoided by coding finite partial functions into natural numbers. System T may thus be
coded in Gödel’s T. As proved in [1, 4], T is strongly normalizing, has the uniqueness-of-
normal-form property and the following normal form theorem also holds.
 Lemma 2 (Normal Form Property for T + C +R). Assume that R is a functional set of
reduction rules for C. Assume A is either an atomic type or a product type. Then any closed
normal term t ∈ T of type A is: a numeral n : N, or a boolean True, False : Bool, or an
update constant U : U, or a constant of type A, or a pair 〈u, v〉 : B × C.
2.3 The System TClass
We now define a classical extension of T , that we call TClass, with a Skolem function symbol for
each arithmetical formula. The elements of TClass will represent (non-computable) realizers.
 Definition 3 (The System TClass). Define TClass = T + SC, where SC is a countable set of
Skolem function constants, each one of type N → N. We assume to have an enumeration
Φ0,Φ1,Φ2, . . . of all the constants in SC (while generic elements of SC will be denoted with
letters Φ,Ψ,σ, τ, . . .).
Every Φ ∈ SC represents a Skolem function for some arithmetical formula ∃yN A(x, y),
taking as argument a number x and returning some y such that A(x, y) is true if any exists,
and an arbitrary value otherwise. In general, there is no set of computable reduction rules for
the constants in SC, and therefore no set of computable reduction rules for TClass. Each (in
general, non-computable) term t ∈ TClass is associated to a set {t[s] |s ∈ T , s : N2 → N} ⊆ T
of computable terms we call its “approximations”, one for each term s : N2 → N of T ,
which is thought as a sequence s0, s1, s2, . . . of computable approximations of the oracles
Φ0,Φ1,Φ2, . . . (with si we denote s(i)).
 Definition 4 (Approximation at state s). We define:
1. A state is a closed term of type N2 → N of T . If i is a numeral, with si we denote s(i).
2. Assume t ∈ TClass and s is a state. The “approximation of t at state s” is the term t[s]
of T obtained from t by replacing each constant Φi with si.
3 An Interactive Learning-Based Notion of Realizability for
HA
ω
+ EM + SK
In this section we introduce a learning-based notion of realizability for HAω + EM + SK,
Heyting Arithmetic in all finite types (see e.g. Troelstra [19]) plus Excluded Middle and
Skolem axiom schemes for all arithmetical formulas. Then we prove our main Theorem, the
Adequacy Theorem: “if a closed formula is provable in HAω+EM+SK, then it is realizable”.
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Types
σ, τ ::= N | Bool | U | σ → τ | σ × τ
Constants
c ::= Rτ | ifτ | 0 | S | True | False | min | get | mkupd | ⋒ | U (∀U ∈ U)
Terms
t, u ::= c | xτ | tu | λxτu | 〈t, u〉 | π0u | π1u
Typing Rules for Variables and Constants
xτ : τ
0 : N
S : N → N
True : Bool
False : Bool
U : U (for every U ∈ U)
⋒ : U → U → U
min : U → N
get : U → N → N → N → N
mkupd : N → N → N → U
ifτ : Bool → τ → τ → τ
Rτ : τ → (N → (τ → τ))→ N → τ
Typing Rules for Composed Terms
t : σ → τ u : σ
tu : τ
u : τ
λxσu : σ → τ
u : σ t : τ
〈u, t〉 : σ × τ
u : τ0 × τ1
i ∈ {0, 1}πiu : τi
Reduction Rules All the usual reduction rules for simply typed lambda calculus (see Girard [14]) plus
the rules for recursion, if-then-else and projections
Rτuv0 7→ u RτuvS(t) 7→ vt(Rτuvt)
ifτ Trueu v 7→ u ifτ False u v 7→ v πi〈u0, u1〉 7→ ui, i = 0, 1
plus the following ones, assuming a, n,m, l be numerals:
minU 7→
{
a if ∃m,n. (a, n,m) ∈ U ∧ ∀(b, i, j) ∈ U ⇒ a ≤ b
0 otherwise
getU an l 7→
{
m if ∃m. (a, n,m) ∈ U
l otherwise
U1 ⋒ U2 7→ U1 U U2
mkupd a nm 7→ {(a, n,m)}
Figure 1 the extension T of Gödel’s system T
We first define the formal system HAω + EM + SK. We represent atomic predicates of
HAω+EM+SK with closed terms of TClass of type Bool. Terms of HA
ω+EM+SK are elements
of TClass and thus may include the function symbols in SC. We assume having in Gödel’s T
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some terms ⇒Bool: Bool → Bool → Bool,¬Bool : Bool → Bool,∨Bool : Bool → Bool →
Bool . . ., implementing boolean connectives. As usual, we shall use infix notation: for
example, we write t1 ⇒Bool t2 in place of ⇒Bool t1t2 and similarly for the other connectives.
3.1 Language of HAω + EM + SK
We now define the language of the arithmetical theory HAω + EM+ SK.
 Definition 5 (Language of HAω + EM + SK). The language LClass of HA
ω + EM + SK is
defined as follows.
1. The terms of LClass are all t ∈ TClass.
2. The atomic formulas of LClass are all Q ∈ TClass such that Q : Bool.
3. The formulas of LClass are built from atomic formulas of LClass by the connectives ∨,∧,→
, r , ∀, ∃ as usual, with quantifiers possibly ranging over variables xτ , yτ , zτ , . . . of arbit-
rary finite type τ of TClass.
4. A formula of LClass is said arithmetical if it does not contain constants in SC and all its
quantifiers range over the type N, i.e. it has one of the following forms: ∀xNA, ∃xNA,A ∨
B,A ∧B,A→ B,ArB,P , with A,B arithmetical and P atomic formula of T .
We denote with ⊥ the atomic formula False and with ¬A the formula A → ⊥. ArB
is the dual of implication as in bi-intuitionistic logic and means “A and the opposite of B”.
If F is a formula of LClass in the free variables x
τ1
1 , . . . , x
τn
n and t1 : τ1, . . . , tn : τn are terms
of LClass, with F (t1, . . . , tn) we shall denote the formula F [t1/x1, . . . , tn/xn]. Sequences of
variable xN1, . . . , x
N
k will be written as ~x. We denote with 〈~x〉 a term of T in the free numeric
variables ~x representing a injection of Nk into N. Moreover, for every sequence of numerals
~n = n1, . . . , nk, we define 〈~n〉 := 〈~x〉[~n/~x] and assume that the function ~n 7→ 〈~n〉 is a
bijection.
The Excluded Middle axiom scheme EM is defined as the set of all formulas of the form:
∀~x N. A(~x) ∨ ¬A(~x)
where A is an arithmetical formula.
The Skolem axiom scheme SK contains for each arithmetical formula A(~x, y) an axiom:
∀~x N. ∃yNA(~x, y)→ A(~x,Φ〈~x〉)
with Φ ∈ SC. We assume that for every Φ ∈ SC there is in SK one and only one formula in
which Φ occurs. Such unique formula A is said to be the formula associated to Φ and Φ will
be sometimes written as ΦA. If s is a state and Φi = ΦA, with sA we denote si and with
mkupdAu t we denote mkupd i u t. With lev(Φ) we denote the number measuring the logical
complexity of the formula A associated to Φ, i.e. the number of quantifiers occurring in A.
If s, s′ are two states and n a numeral, we write s ≡ s′ lev(n) if for every A of complexity
strictly less than n, one has sA(m) = s
′
A(m) for all numerals m.
For each formula F of LClass, its involutive negation F⊥ is defined by induction on F .
First, we say that an atomic formula P is positive if it is of the form ¬Bool . . .¬BoolQ, Q is
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not of the form ¬BoolR, and the number of ¬Bool in front of Q is even. Then we define:
(¬BoolP )
⊥ = P (if P positive) P⊥ = ¬BoolP (if P positive)
(A ∧B)⊥ = A⊥ ∨B⊥ (A ∨B)⊥ = A⊥ ∧B⊥
(A→ B)⊥ = ArB (ArB)⊥ = A→ B
(∀xτA)⊥ = ∃xτA⊥ (∃xτA)⊥ = ∀xτA⊥
As usual, one has (F⊥)⊥ = F .
3.2 Truth Value of a Formula in a State
The axioms of the system HAω + EM+ SK give a great computational power to the system
TClass: one can “compute” by a term χF of TClass the truth value of any arithmetical formula
F . When one effectively evaluates χF in a particular state s, we say that one computes the
truth value of a formula F in a state s.
 Definition 6 (Truth Value of a Formula F in a State s). For every arithmetical formula
F (~x) of LClass we define, by induction on F , a term χF : Bool of system TClass, with the same
free variables of F :
χP = P, P atomic
χA∨B = χA ∨Bool χB χ∀yNA = χA[ΦA⊥〈~x〉/y] χArB = χA ∧Bool χB⊥
χA∧B = χA ∧Bool χB χ∃yNA = χA[ΦA〈~x〉/y] χA→B = χA ⇒Bool χB
We define F s := χF [s] and call it the truth value of F in the state s.
Intuitively, if F (~n) is a closed formula, our intended interpretation is:
1. χF (~n) is a term of TClass denoting, in any standard model of HA
ω + EM+ SK, the truth
value of F (~n).
2. F s(~n) is a term of T computing what would be the truth value of F (~n) in some standard
model of HAω+EM under the (possible false) assumption that the interpretation Φi 7→ si
satisfies the axioms of SK.
We remark that thus F s(~n) is only a conditional truth value: if F s(~n) is not the correct
truth value of F (~n) – it may well happen – then the interpretation Φi 7→ si does not satisfy
the axioms of SK. This subtle point is what makes possible learning in Interactive realizab-
ility: whenever a contradiction follows, realizers are able to effectively find counterexamples
to the assertion that the interpretation Φi 7→ si satisfies the axioms of SK. We also ob-
serve that this way of computing the truth of a formula comes from the epsilon substitution
method (see Avigad [7], Mints et al. [17]).
The notion of truth in a state behaves as expected with respect to involutive negation.
 Proposition 7 (Truth in a State and Truth). For every arithmetical formula F (~x), state s
and sequence of numerals ~n, F s(~n) = False ⇐⇒ (F⊥)s(~n) = True
Proof. By induction and according to the shape of F we prove that χF [s](~n) = False if
and only if χF⊥ [s](~n) = True.
F = P , with P atomic. Then χP = P and χP⊥ = P
⊥ ≡ ¬BoolP . Therefore
χF [s](~n) = False ⇐⇒ χF⊥ [s](~n) = True
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F = A ∧B. Then F⊥ = A⊥ ∧B⊥. Moreover,
χA∧B = χA ∧Bool χB
χA⊥∨B⊥ = χA⊥ ∨Bool χB⊥
Therefore, χA∧B[s](~n) = False if and only if χA[s](~n) = False or χB[s](~n) = False if
and only if (by induction hypothesis) χA⊥ [s](~n) = True or χB⊥ [s](~n) = True if and only
if χA⊥∨B⊥ [s](~n) = True.
F = A ∨B. Then F⊥ = A⊥ ∧B⊥. Moreover,
χA∨B = χA ∨Bool χB
χA⊥∧B⊥ = χA⊥ ∧Bool χB⊥
Therefore, χA∨B[s](~n) = False if and only if χA[s](~n) = False and χB[s](~n) = False
if and only if (by induction hypothesis) χA⊥ [s](~n) = True and χB⊥ [s](~n) = True if and
only if χA⊥∧B⊥ [s](~n) = True.
F = A→ B. Then F⊥ = ArB. Moreover,
χA→B = χA ⇒Bool χB
χArB = χA ∧Bool χB⊥
Therefore, χA→B[s](~n) = False if and only if χA[s](~n) = True and χB[s](~n) = False if
and only if (by induction hypothesis) χA[s](~n) = True and χB⊥ [s](~n) = True if and only
if χArB[s](~n) = True.
F = ArB. Then F⊥ = A→ B. Moreover,
χArB = χA ∧Bool χB⊥
χA→B = χA ⇒Bool χB
Therefore, χArB[s](~n) = False if and only if χA[s](~n) = False or χB⊥ [s](~n) = False if
and only if (by induction hypothesis) χA[s](~n) = False or χB[s](~n) = True if and only
if χA→B[s](~n) = True.
F = ∀yNA. Then F⊥ = ∃yNA⊥. Moreover,
χ∀yNA = χA[ΦA⊥〈~x〉/y]
χ∃yNA⊥ = χA⊥ [ΦA⊥〈~x〉/y]
Therefore, χ∀yNA[s](~n) = False if and only if χA[s](~n)[sA⊥〈~n〉/y] = False if and only if
(by induction hypothesis) χA⊥ [s](~n)[sA⊥〈~n〉/y] = True if and only if χ∃yNA⊥ [s](~n) = True.
F = ∃yNA. Then F⊥ = ∀yNA⊥. Moreover,
χ∃yNA = χA[ΦA〈~x〉/y]
χ∀yNA⊥ = χA⊥ [Φ(A⊥)⊥〈~x〉/y] = χA⊥ [ΦA〈~x〉/y]
Therefore, χ∃yNA[s](~n) = False if and only if χA[s](~n)[sA〈~n〉/y] = False if and only if
(by induction hypothesis) χA⊥ [s](~n)[sA〈~n〉/y] = True if and only if χ∀yNA⊥ [s](~n) = True.
◭
We now prove a fundamental fact: the truth of a formula F in a state s is determined
by the approximations that s gives to the Skolem functions of strictly lower level than the
logical complexity of F .
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 Proposition 8. Let F (~x) be any arithmetical formula of logical complexity m, ~n be a
sequence of numerals and s, s′ be states such that s ≡ s′ lev(m). Then F s(~n) = F s
′
(~n).
Proof. By inspection of the definition 6 of F s = χF [s], it can be seen that for every Skolem
constant ΦA occurring in χF , one has lev(ΦA) < m. Moreover, for every A of complexity
less than m, sA(n) = s
′
A(n) for every numeral n. Since both F
s and F s
′
result from the
substitution of each ΦA occurring in χF with respectively sA and s
′
A, it must be that F
s(~n)
and F s
′
(~n) reduce to the same boolean. ◭
Every state s is considered as an approximation of the Skolem functions denoted by the
constants of SC: for each formula A, sA may be a correct approximation of ΦA on some
arguments, but wrong on other ones. More precisely, if Φi = ΦA, we are going to consider
the set of (i, 〈~n〉) such that As(~n, sA〈~n〉) = True as the real “domain” of s, representing the
set of arguments at which sA is surely a correct approximation of ΦA, in the sense that sA
returns an appropriate witness (but observe that the truth of A is approximated in s).
 Definition 9 (Sound Updates, Domains). We define:
1. Given an update U and a state s, we define doms(U) as the set of pairs of numerals (i, 〈~n〉)
such that A(~x, y) is the formula associated to Φi, (i, 〈~n〉,m) ∈ U and As(~n,m) = True.
U is said to be sound in the state s if (i, 〈~n〉,m) ∈ U implies (i, 〈~n〉) ∈ doms(U).
2. Similarly, if s is a state, we denote with dom(s) the set of pairs of numerals (i, 〈~n〉) such
that A(~x, y) is the formula associated to Φi, si〈~n〉 = m and As(~n,m) = True.
From now onwards, for every pair of terms t1, t2 of system T , we shall write t1 = t2 if they
are the same term modulo the equality rules corresponding to the reduction rules of system
T (equivalently, if they have the same normal form).
3.3 Interactive Realizability
For every formula A of LClass, we now define what type |A| a realizer of A must have.
 Definition 10 (Types for realizers). For each formula A of LClass we define a type |A| of
TClass by induction on A:
|P | = U, if P is atomic
|A ∧B| = |A| × |B| |∃xτA| = τ × |A| |ArB| = |A| × |B⊥|
|A ∨B| = Bool× (|A| × |B|) |∀xτA| = τ → |A| |A→ B| = |A| → |B|
Let now p0 := π0 : σ0 × (σ1 × σ2) → σ0, p1 := π0π1 : σ0 × (σ1 × σ2) → σ1 and
p2 := π1π1 : σ0 × (σ1 ×σ2)→ σ2 be the three canonical projections from σ0 × (σ1 ×σ2). We
define the realizability relation t  F , where t ∈ TClass, F ∈ LClass and t : |F |.
 Definition 11 (Interactive Realizability). Assume s is a state, t is a closed term of TClass,
F ∈ LClass is a closed formula, and t : |F |. We define first the relation t s F by induction
and by cases according to the form of F :
1. t s Q for some atomic Q if and only if U = t[s] implies:
U is sound in s and doms(U) ∩ dom(s) = ∅
U = ∅ implies Q[s] = True
2. t s A ∧B if and only if π0t s A and π1t s B
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3. t s A ∨B if and only if either p0t[s] = True and p1t s A, or p0t[s] = False and
p2t s B
4. t s A→ B if and only if for all u, if u s A, then tu s B
5. t s ArB if and only if π0t s A and π1t s B
⊥
6. t s ∀x
τA if and only if for all closed terms u : τ of T , tu s A[u/x]
7. t s ∃xτA if and only for some closed term u : τ of T , π0t[s] = u and π1t s A[u/x]
We define t  F if and only if for all states s of T , t s F .
The ideas behind the definition of s in the case of HA
ω + EM + SK are those we
already explained in [1, 4, 6]. A realizer is a term t of TClass, possibly containing some
non-computable Skolem function of SC; if such a function was computable, t would be an
intuitionistic realizer. Since in general t is not computable, we calculate its approximation
t[s] at state s. t is an intelligent, self-correcting program, representing a proof/construction
depending on the state s. The realizer interacts with the environment, which may provide
a counter-proof, a counterexample invalidating the current construction of the realizer. But
the realizer is always able to turn such a negative outcome into a positive information, which
consists in some new piece of knowledge learned about some Skolem function Φi.
There are two concepts that are useful to understand the interaction of a realizer with
the environment: a realizer receives as input tests and produces as output predictions.
Predictions.
A realizer t of A ∨ B uses s to predict which one between A and B is realizable: if
π0t[s] = True then A is realizable, and if π0t[s] = False then B is realizable.
A realizer u of ∃xτA uses s to compute π0u[s] = w and to predict that w is a witness
for ∃xτA (i.e. that A[w/x] is realizable).
Tests.
A realizer of a universal formula ∀xτA takes an object w as a challenge coming from
the environment to provide a construction of A[w/x], whose correctness will be tested
at the end of computation.
A realizer of A→ B takes a realizer of A as a challenge coming from the environment
to provide a construction of B, whose correctness will be tested at the end of the
computation.
A realizer of A ∧ B may be challenged to construct A as well as B, and again the
correctness of the construction will be tested at the end of computation.
A realizer of an atomic formula Q comes after a series of predictions and challenges
that have been provided to test the construction of a complex formula; the realizer
performs a final test and computes the formula Q in the state s as an experiment.
Since predictions of realizers need not be always correct, it is possible that a realized
atomic formula is actually false; we may have t s Q and Q[s] = False in T . If
Q, though predicted to be true, is instead false, then a counterexample has been
encountered; this means that the approximation s of the Skolem constants in SC is
still inadequate. In this case, t[s] 6= ∅ by definition of t s Q. That is to say: if the
construction of a realizer is wrong in a particular state, the realizer must learn from
its mistakes. The point is that after every learning, the actual state can be improved
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with the information in U = t[s], since (i, 〈~n〉) ∈ U and A is associated to Φi imply
As(~n,m) = True and As(~n, si〈~n〉) = False.
The next proposition tells that realizability at state s respects the notion of equality of
TClass terms, when the latter is relativized to state s. That is, if two terms are equal at the
state s, then they realize the same formulas in the state s.
 Proposition 12 (Saturation). If t1[s] = t2[s] and u1[s] = u2[s], then t1 s B[u1/x] if and
only if t2 s B[u2/x].
Proof. By straightforward induction on A. ◭
3.4 Realizability of Classical Axioms
We are now going to show how to realize EM and SK. We first need to realize the ex-falso-
quodlibet axiom, for which a dummy term is enough.
 Proposition 13 (Realizer of the Ex-Falso-Quodlibet Axiom). For every formula F (~x) of
LClass, there exists a closed term ⊥F of T such that ⊥F  ⊥ → F (~u), for every sequence of
closed terms ~u of TClass. In particular, ⊥F can be defined by induction on F as follows:
⊥P := λx
U. x ⊥A→B := λx
Uλy|A|.⊥Bx
⊥A∧B := λx
U.〈⊥Ax,⊥Bx〉 ⊥∃xτA := λx
U〈0τ ,⊥Ax〉
⊥A∨B := λx
U.〈False,⊥Ax,⊥Bx〉 ⊥∀xτA := λx
Uλyτ .⊥Ax
⊥ArB := λx
U〈⊥Ax,⊥B⊥x〉
Proof. Suppose t s ⊥. Then t[s] = U , for some sound, non-empty update U such that
dom(s)∩doms(U) = ∅. We show by induction and according to the shape of F that ⊥F t  F .
F = P , with P atomic. Then, ⊥P t[s] = (λxUx)t[s] = U . Thus, ⊥P t s P (~u).
F = A→ B. Suppose v s A(~u). We have to show that
⊥P tv = (λx
Uλy|A|.⊥Bx)tv = ⊥Bt s B(~u)
which is indeed true by induction hypothesis.
All the other cases follows by straightforward application of the induction hypothesis.
◭
In Interactive realizability, as we shall see many times, realizers continually interact
with each other and game theory is a very useful tool to describe they behaviour (see [5]).
Interestingly, for realizing Skolem axioms and some instances of EM we are lead to consider
once again Tarski games. In these kind of games, there are two players and an arithmetical
formula on the board; the first player – usually called Eloise – tries to show that it is true,
while the second player – usually called Abelard – tries to show that the formula is false.
Thus, Eloise wins when true atomic formulas are on the board while Abelard wins with
false ones. In the case of formulas of the shape A ∨ B,∃xNA, Eloise moves: in the first
case by choosing a side of the disjunction and in the second case by choosing a numeral as
a witness for the existential quantifier. In the case of formulas of the shape A ∧ B,∀xNA,
Abelard moves: in the first case by choosing a side of the conjunction and in the second
case by choosing a numeral as a counterexample to the universal quantifier. In the case of
formulas of the shape A → B, Abelard gives a winning strategy for A to Eloise and they
play the game for B. An Eloise strategy for A is represented by a term E of type |A|, while
an Abelard strategy for A is represented by a term A of type |A⊥|. Thus one may define
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the Tarski game between strategies through a game operator ⋆ (which indeed resembles the
operator ⋆ of symmetric lambda calculus [8]) that puts Eloise against Abelard. The result
of the game is thus E ⋆ A and it is a term of type |⊥| = U. If E and A happens to be
interactive realizers, they represent self-correcting constructions. E and A challenge the
construction of each other, but who looses the interaction is always able to partially repair
its construction, i.e. to learn some information about some Skolem functions, which he puts
in some update. That is to say, E ⋆A realizes ⊥. Details follow.
 Proposition 14 (A Tarski Game Between Strategies). Let F be an arithmetical formula and
E : |F |, A : |F⊥| two terms of TClass. Define by induction and according to the shape of F a
term E ⋆A : |⊥| as follows:
(F = P, P atomic) E ⋆A := E ⋒A
(F = A→ B) E ⋆A := E (π0A ) ⋆ π1A (F = ArB) E ⋆A := A (π0E ) ⋆ π1E
(F = ∃yNA) E ⋆A := π1E ⋆A (π0E ) (F = ∀y
NA) E ⋆A := E (π0A ) ⋆ π1A
(F = A ∧B) E ⋆A := if p0A then π0E ⋆ p1A else π1E ⋆ p2A
(F = A ∨B) E ⋆A := if p0E then p1E ⋆ π0A else p2E ⋆ π1A
Then E s F ∧A s F⊥ =⇒ E ⋆A s ⊥.
Proof. Assume E s F and A s F
⊥. We prove by induction and according to the shape
of F that E ⋆A s ⊥.
F = P , with P atomic. Then, either P [s] = False or P⊥[s] = False. If we let
E [s] = U1 and A [s] = U2, then U1, U2 are sound updates, dom(s) ∩ doms(U1) = ∅,
dom(s) ∩ doms(U2) = ∅ and either U1 6= ∅ or U2 6= ∅. Thus, if we let U3 = U1UU2, we
have
(E ⋆A )[s] = E [s] ⋒A [s] = U1 ⋒ U2 = U3
and indeed, U3 is sound, non-empty and dom(s) ∩ doms(U3) = ∅, which means that
E ⋆A s ⊥.
F = A ∧B. Then, F⊥ = A⊥ ∨B⊥. Now, either p0A [s] = True or p0A [s] = False. In
the first case,
E ⋆A [s] = (if p0A then π0E ⋆ p1A else π1E ⋆ p2A )[s] = π0E ⋆ p1A [s]
Since A s A
⊥ ∨ B⊥, one has p1A s A⊥. Since E s A ∧ B, one has π0E s A.
Therefore by induction hypothesis,
π0E ⋆ p1A s ⊥
We conclude by saturation (proposition 12) that E ⋆A s ⊥. The second case is treated
in analogous way.
F = A ∨ B. Then, F⊥ = A⊥ ∧ B⊥. Now, either p0E [s] = True or p0E [s] = False. In
the first case,
E ⋆A [s] = (if p0E then p1E ⋆ π0A else p2E ⋆ π1A )[s] = p1E ⋆ π0A [s]
Since A s A
⊥ ∧ B⊥, one has π0A s A⊥. Since E s A ∨ B, one has p1E s A.
Therefore by induction hypothesis,
p1E ⋆ π0A s ⊥
We conclude by saturation (proposition 12) that E ⋆A s ⊥. The second case is treated
in analogous way.
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F = A→ B. Then, F⊥ = ArB. By definition
E ⋆A = E (π0A ) ⋆ π1A
Since A s ArB, one has π0A s A and π1A s B
⊥. Since E s A → B, one has
E (π0A ) s B. Therefore by induction hypothesis
E (π0A ) ⋆ π1A s ⊥
which is the thesis.
F = ArB. Then, F⊥ = A→ B. By definition
E ⋆A = A (π0E ) ⋆ π1E
Since E s ArB, one has π0E s A and π1E s B
⊥. Since A s A → B, one has
A (π0E ) s B. Therefore by induction hypothesis
A (π0E ) ⋆ π1E s ⊥
which is the thesis.
F = ∀yNA. Then, F⊥ = ∃yNA⊥. Let π0A [s] = n. By definition
E ⋆A [s] = (E (π0A ) ⋆ π1A )[s] = E n ⋆ π1A [s]
Since A s ∃yNA⊥, one has π1A s A⊥(n). Since E s ∀yNA, one has E n s A(n).
Therefore by induction hypothesis
E n ⋆ π1A s ⊥
We conclude by saturation (proposition 12) that E ⋆A s ⊥.
F = ∃yNA. Then, F = ∀yNA⊥. Let π0E [s] = n. By definition
E ⋆A [s] = (π1E ⋆A (π0E ))[s] = π1E ⋆A n[s]
Since A s ∀yNA⊥, one has A n s A⊥(n). Since E s ∃yNA, one has π1E s A(n).
Therefore by induction hypothesis
π1E ⋆A n s ⊥
We conclude by saturation (proposition 12) that E ⋆A s ⊥.
◭
We now establish two important links between the concept of truth in a state and the
concept of realizability in the same state.
The first result is that if a formula is true in a state s, then it is realizable in s. Intuitively,
F s = True means that the state s is both: i) powerful enough to compute witnesses for all
the subformulas of F and their negations which are supposed to be true if F is true; ii) sharp
enough to not provide counterexamples invalidating some of those witnesses. Thus F can
be realized in the state s by a realizer TF which uses s to return the mentioned witnesses
and “waits” for possible counterexamples.
One could expect the converse to hold as well, namely that if F is realizable in s, then
F is true in s. This is not actually true, but “almost”. Indeed, the second result is that
if F is realizable in s and F s = False, one has disastrous consequences: ⊥ is realizable
in s. In fact, one can define a term FF transforming any realizer E of F in the state s
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in a realizer of ⊥ in the same s, whenever F s = False. Indeed, if F s = False, then
(F⊥)s = True by proposition 7; therefore A := TF⊥ realizes F
⊥ in s. The state s is thus
used to build a counterexample A to F , which can be put against the realizer E of F in
the term E ⋆ A . This latter term realizes ⊥ by proposition 14. Intuitively, if s is a strong
enough approximation, A wins and thus provides a counterexample to the fact that E is a
construction of F ; since E , as realizer, is a self-correcting program, it is able to extend the
state s with new information: this information realizes ⊥ in s. If instead s is not a good
approximation, E wins and the capabilities of A are used to improve the state s with an
update realizing ⊥. Formally:
 Proposition 15 (Truth and Realizability in a State). Let F (~x) be an arithmetical formula.
There exist two terms TF (~x) and FF (~x) of TClass such that for all numerals ~n and state s
F s(~n) = True =⇒ TF (~n) s F (~n) (1)
F s(~n) = False =⇒ FF (~n) s ¬F (~n) (2)
In particular, TF and FF can be constructed by induction on F as follows:
TP := ∅, P atomic TA→B := λz
|A|. if χA then TB else ⊥B(FAz)
TA∧B := 〈TA,TB〉 T∀yNA := λy
N. if χA then TA else ⊥AmkupdA
⊥ 〈~x〉 y
TA∨B := 〈χA,TA,TB〉 T∃yNA := 〈ΦA〈~x〉,TA[ΦA〈~x〉/y]〉
TArB := 〈TA,TB⊥〉 FF := λx
|F |. x ⋆TF⊥
Proof. We first prove (1) by induction and according to the shape of F .
F = P , with P atomic. Suppose P [s](~n) = True. Then, by the very definition 11 of
realizability of atomic formulas, we obtain TP = ∅ s P (~n).
F = A∧B. Suppose F s(~n) = True and thus As(~n) = True = Bs(~n). Then, by induction
hypothesis TA(~n) s A(~n) and TB(~n) s B(~n). Therefore
π0TA∧B(~n) = π0〈TA(~n),TB(~n)〉 = TA(~n) s A(~n)
π1TA∧B(~n) = π1〈TA(~n),TB(~n)〉 = TB(~n) s B(~n)
and thus TA∧B(~n) s A ∧B(~n).
F = ArB. Same proof of the case F = A ∧B⊥.
F = A ∨ B. Suppose F s(~n) = True. Then, either As(~n) = True or Bs(~n) = True. In
the first case,
p0TA∨B(~n)[s] = p0〈χA(~n),TA(~n),TB(~n)〉[s] = χA(~n)[s] = A
s(~n) = True
and indeed by induction hypothesis
p1TA∨B(~n) = TA(~n) s A(~n)
In the second case, we obtain as well TB(~n)  B(~n). Therefore, we obtain TA∨B(~n) s
A ∨B(~n).
F = A→ B. Suppose F s(~n) = True and t s A(~n); we have to show that TA→B(~n)t s
B(~n). We have either As(~n) = True or As(~n) = False. In the first case, Bs(~n) = True
and we obtain
TA→B(~n)t[s] =
(
if χA(~n) then TB(~n) else ⊥B(~n)(FA(~n)t)
)
[s] = TB(~n)[s]
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By induction hypothesis,TB(~n) s B(~n). By saturation (proposition 12), alsoTA→B(~n)t s
B(~n). In the second case, by induction hypothesis TA⊥(~n) s A
⊥(~n), for by proposition
7, (A⊥)s(~n) = True. Therefore, by proposition 14
FA⊥(~n)t = t ⋆TA⊥(~n) s ⊥
and thus by proposition 13
⊥B(~n)(FA(~n)t) s B(~n)
Moreover,
TA→B(~n)t[s] = ⊥B(~n)(FA(~n)t)[s]
We conclude by saturation that TA→B(~n)t s B(~n), which is the thesis.
F = ∀yNA. Suppose F s(~n) = True. By definition 6 of F s(~n),
As(~n, sA⊥〈~n〉) = χA[s](~n, sA⊥〈~n〉) = True
Let m be any numeral. We have to show that
T∀yNA(~n)m = if χA(~n,m) then TA(~n,m) else ⊥A(~n)mkupdA
⊥ 〈~n〉m s A(~n,m)
Now, we have either As(~n,m) = True or As(~n,m) = False. In the first case,
T∀yNA(~n)m[s] = TA(~n,m)[s]
and by induction hypothesis TA(~n,m) s A(~n,m); we obtain the thesis by saturation
(proposition 12). In the second case,
T∀yNA(~n)m[s] = ⊥A(~n)mkupdA
⊥ 〈~n〉m[s]
Since by proposition 7 (A⊥)s(~n,m) = True and (A⊥)s(~n, sA⊥〈~n〉) = False, we obtain
mkupdA⊥ 〈~n〉m s ⊥
Therefore, by proposition 13
⊥A(~n)mkupdA
⊥ 〈~n〉m s A(~n)
and we obtain the thesis by saturation (proposition 12).
F = ∃yNA. Suppose F s(~n) = True. We have to show that
T∃yNA(~n) = 〈ΦA〈~n〉,TA(~n)[ΦA〈~n〉/y]〉s ∃y
NA(~n)
Thus if we let
π0T∃yNA(~n)[s] = sA(~n) = m
we have to show that
π1T∃yNA(~n) s A(~n,m)
By definition 6 of F s(~n),
χA[s](~n, sA〈~n〉) = True
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Therefore, by induction hypothesis
TA(~n,m) s A(~n,m)
But
π1T∃yNA(~n)[s] = TA(~n)[ΦA〈~n〉/y][s] = TA(~n,m)[s]
Thus, by saturation (proposition 12), we obtain the thesis.
We now prove (2). Suppose F s(~n) = False and E s F (~n). We have to show that
FF (~n)E = E ⋆TF⊥(~n) s ⊥
By proposition 7, (F⊥)s(~n) = True. By (1), TF⊥(~n) s F
⊥(~n). Therefore, by proposition
14, E ⋆TF⊥(~n) s ⊥.
◭
The most remarkable feature of our realizability semantics is the existence of a realizer
for any instance of EM, even if our language contains the positive symbols ∨, ∃ which have
to be realized according to the Kreisel-style clauses of our definition of realizability.
 Proposition 16 (Realizer EA of EM). Let A(~x) be any arithmetical formula. Define
EA := λ~x
N. 〈χA,TA,FA〉
Then EA  ∀~x N. A(~x) ∨ ¬A(~x).
Proof. Let ~n be any sequence of numerals and s any state. We have to show that
EA~n = 〈χA(~n),TA(~n),FA(~n)〉 s A(~n) ∨ ¬A(~n)
We have two cases:
1. χA(~n)[s] = True. Then, by definition 6, A
s(~n) = True and thus by proposition 15,
TA(~n) s A(~n) which is the thesis.
2. χA(~n)[s] = False. Then, by definition 6, A
s(~n) = False and thus by proposition 15,
FA(~n) s ¬A(~n) which is the thesis.
◭
We observe that the excluded middle can very well be defined as ∀~x N. A(~x) ∨ A⊥(~x). In
the case of Σ0n-formulas, one would get a simplified realizer of the form λ~x
N. 〈χA,TA,TA⊥〉,
which does not use the game operator ⋆ contained in FA. In the case of Σ
0
1-formulas, one
recovers as a special case exactly the realizer of [1], where Interactive realizability was first
defined for HA + EM1 + SK1. We also observe that the realizer EA, when evaluated in any
state, uses two instructions: the read from the state operation for satisfying the constructive
clauses of realizability and the update of the state operation for dealing with counterexamples
to universal quantifiers.
We now show how to realize the Skolem axiom scheme SK.
 Proposition 17 (Realizer SA of SK). Let A(~x, y) be any arithmetical formula and Φ the
Skolem function constant associated to A. Define
SA := λ~x
Nλz|∃y
NA|. if χ∃yNA then TA[Φ〈~x〉/y] else ⊥A(~x,Φ〈~x〉)(F∃yNAz)
Then SA  ∀~x N. ∃yNA(~x, y)→ A(~x,Φ〈~x〉).
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Proof. Let s be any state, ~n a sequence of numerals and suppose t s ∃yNA(~n, y). We
have to show that SA~nt s A(~n,Φ〈~n〉). Let m = sA(~n). By saturation (proposition 12), it
suffices to prove that SA~nt[s] s A(~n,m). There are two cases:
1. As(~n,m) = True. Then, since by definition 6
χ∃yNA(~n)[s] = χA[Φ〈~x〉/y][~n/~x][s] = χA[s](~n,m) = A
s(~n,m)
we obtain by proposition 15
SA~nt[s] = TA(~n,m)[s] s A(~n,m)
which is the thesis.
2. As(~n,m) = False. Then, (∃yNA)
s
(~n) = False. Therefore, by proposition 15
F∃yNA(~n) s ¬∃y
NA(~n, y)
and thus F∃yNA(~n)t s ⊥. We conclude by proposition 13 that
SA~nt[s] = ⊥A(~x,Φ〈~x〉)F∃yNA(~n)t s A(~x,Φ〈~x〉)
which is the thesis.
◭
3.5 Curry-Howard Correspondence for HAω + EM + SK
In figure 2, we define a standard natural deduction system for HAω + EM+ SK (see [18], for
example) together with a term assignment in the spirit of Curry-Howard correspondence for
classical logic.
We replace purely universal axioms (i.e., Π01-axioms) with Post rules, which are inferences
of the form
Γ ⊢ A1 Γ ⊢ A2 · · · Γ ⊢ An
Γ ⊢ A
where A1, . . . , An, A are atomic formulas of LClass such that for every substitution σ =
[t1/x1, . . . , tk/xk] of closed terms t1, . . . , tk of T and state s, A1σ[s] = . . . = Anσ[s] = True
implies Aσ[s] = True. Let now eq : N2 → Bool be a term of Gödel’s system T representing
equality between natural numbers. Among the Post rules, we have the Peano axioms and
axioms of equality
Γ ⊢ eq S(x)S(y)
Γ ⊢ eq x y
Γ ⊢ eq 0S(x)
Γ ⊢ ⊥ Γ ⊢ eq x x
Γ ⊢ eq x y Γ ⊢ eq y z
Γ ⊢ eq x z
Γ ⊢ A(x) Γ ⊢ eqx y
Γ ⊢ A(y)
and for every A1, A2 such that A1 = A2 is an equation of Gödel’s system T (equivalently,
A1, A2 have the same normal form in T), we have the rule
Γ ⊢ A1
Γ ⊢ A2
We also have a Post rule
Γ ⊢ A1 Γ ⊢ A2 · · · Γ ⊢ An
Γ ⊢ A
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Contexts With Γ we denote contexts of the form x1 : A1, . . . , xn : An, with x1, . . . , xn proof variables
and A1, . . . , An formulas of LClass.
Axioms Γ, x : A ⊢ x|A| : A
Conjunction
Γ ⊢ u : A Γ ⊢ t : B
Γ ⊢ 〈u, t〉 : A ∧ B
Γ ⊢ u : A ∧ B
Γ ⊢ π0u : A
Γ ⊢ u : A ∧B
Γ ⊢ π1u : B
Subtraction
Γ ⊢ u : A Γ ⊢ t : B⊥
Γ ⊢ 〈u, t〉 : ArB
Γ ⊢ u : ArB
Γ ⊢ π0u : A
Γ ⊢ u : ArB
Γ ⊢ π1u : B
⊥
Implication
Γ ⊢ u : A→ B Γ ⊢ t : A
Γ ⊢ ut : B
Γ, x : A ⊢ u : B
Γ ⊢ λx|A|u : A→ B
Disjunction Intro.
Γ ⊢ u : A
Γ ⊢ 〈True, u, d|B|〉 : A ∨B
Γ ⊢ u : A
Γ ⊢ 〈False, d|A|, u〉 : A ∨ B
Disjunction Elim.
Γ ⊢ u : A ∨ B Γ, x : A ⊢ w1 : C Γ, x : B ⊢ w2 : C
Γ ⊢ if p0u then (λx
|A|w1)(p1u) else (λx
|B|w2)(p2u) : C
Universal Quantification
Γ ⊢ u : ∀ατA
Γ ⊢ ut : A[t/ατ ]
Γ ⊢ u : A
Γ ⊢ λατu : ∀ατA
where t is a term of LClass and α
N does not occur free in any formula B occurring in Γ.
Existential Quantification
Γ ⊢ u : A[t/ατ ]
Γ ⊢ 〈t, u〉 : ∃ατ .A
Γ ⊢ u : ∃ατ .A Γ, x : A ⊢ t : C
Γ ⊢ (λατλx|A| t)(π0u)(π1u) : C
where ατ is not free in C nor in any formula B occurring in Γ.
Induction
Γ ⊢ u : A(0) Γ ⊢ v : ∀αN.A(α) → A(S(α))
Γ ⊢ λαNRuvα : ∀αNA
Post Rules
Γ ⊢ u1 : A1 Γ ⊢ u2 : A2 · · · Γ ⊢ un : An
Γ ⊢ u1 ⋒ u2 ⋒ · · · ⋒ un : A
where n > 0 and A1, A2, . . . , An, A are atomic formulas of LClass, and the rule is a Post rule for
equality, for a Peano axiom or for a classical propositional tautology or for booleans.
Post Rules with no Premises Γ ⊢ ∅ : A
where A is an atomic formula of LClass and an axiom of equality or a classical propositional tautology.
EM Γ ⊢ EA : ∀~x
N. A(~x) ∨ ¬A(~x)
SK Γ ⊢ SA : ∀~x
N. ∃yNA(~x, y)→ A(~x,Φ〈~x〉)
Figure 2 Term Assignement Rules for HAω + EM+ SK
for every classical propositional tautology A1 → . . . → An → A, where for i = 1, . . . , n,
Ai, A are atomic formulas obtained as combination of other atomic formulas by the Gödel’s
system T boolean connectives. As title of example, we have the rules
Γ ⊢ ⊥
Γ ⊢ P
Γ ⊢ B
Γ ⊢ A⇒Bool B
Γ ⊢ A ∧Bool B
Γ ⊢ A
Finally, we have a rule of case reasoning for booleans. For any atomic formula P and any
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formula A[P ] we have:
Γ ⊢ A[True] Γ ⊢ A[False]
Γ ⊢ A[P ]
The connectives ∨Bool and ∨ have the same meaning but they are syntactically different: for
every atomic formula P , we consider P ∨Bool ¬BoolP an atomic formula and P ∨ ¬BoolP a
compound formula. P ∨Bool¬BoolP is an axiom, while may derive HA
ω ⊢ P ∨¬BoolP by case
reasoning.
Assume u1, . . . , un are realizers of the assumptions of a Post rule. Then a realizer of the
conclusion of a Post rule is of the form u = u1 ⋒ · · · ⋒ un. In this case, we have n different
realizers, whose learning capabilities are put together through a sort of union. In order to
prove that u realizes A, assume that u[s] = ∅, then u1[s] = . . . = un[s] = ∅, i.e. all ui “have
nothing to learn”. In that case, each ui must guarantee Ai to be true, and therefore the
conclusion of the Post rule is true, because true premises A1, . . . , An spell a true conclusion
A. Thus, u realizes A.
If T is any type of T , we denote with dT a dummy term of type T , defined by dN = 0,
dBool = False, dU = ∅, dA→B = λzA.dB (with zA any variable of type A), dA×B = 〈dA, dB〉.
We now prove our main theorem, that every theorem of HAω + EM+ SK is realizable.
 Theorem 18 (Adequacy Theorem). Suppose that Γ ⊢ w : A in the system HAω+EM+SK,
with Γ = x1 : A1, . . . , xn : An, and that the free variables of the formulas occurring in Γ and
A are among α1 : τ1, . . . , αk : τk. For all states s and for all closed terms r1 : τ1, . . . , rk : τk
of system T , if there are terms t1, . . . , tn such that
for i = 1, . . . , n, ti s Ai[r1/α1 · · · rk/αk]
then w[t1/x
|A1|
1 · · · tn/x
|An|
n r1/α1 · · · rk/αk] s A[r1/α1 · · · rk/αk]
Proof. Notation: for any term v and formula B, we denote
v[t1/x
|A1|
1 · · · tn/x
|An|
n r1/α1 · · · rk/αk]
with v and
B[r1/α1 · · · rk/αk]
with B. We have |B| = |B| for all formulas B. We denote with = the provable equality in
TClass. We proceed by induction on w. Consider the last rule in the derivation of Γ ⊢ w : A:
1. If it is the rule for variables, then for some i, w = x
|Ai|
i and A = Ai. So w = ti s Ai = A.
2. If it is the ∧I rule, then w = 〈u, t〉, A = B ∧ C, Γ ⊢ u : B and Γ ⊢ t : C. Therefore,
w = 〈u, t〉. By induction hypothesis, π0w = u s B and π1w = t s C; so, by definition,
w s B ∧ C = A.
3. If it is a ∧E rule, say left, then w = π0u and Γ ⊢ u : A ∧B. So w = π0u s A, because
u s A ∧B by induction hypothesis.
4. If it is the r I rule, then w = 〈u, t〉, A = BrC, Γ ⊢ u : B and Γ ⊢ t : C⊥. Therefore,
w = 〈u, t〉. By induction hypothesis, π0w = u s B and π1w = t s C⊥; so, by defini-
tion, w s BrC = A.
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5. If it is a rE rule, say right, then w = π1u and Γ ⊢ u : BrA. So w = π1u s A⊥,
because u s BrA by induction hypothesis.
6. If it is the → E rule, then w = ut, Γ ⊢ u : B → A and Γ ⊢ t : B. So w = ut s A, for
u s B → A and t s B by induction hypothesis.
7. If it is the → I rule, then w = λx|B|u, A = B → C and Γ, x : B ⊢ u : C. Suppose now
that t s B; we have to prove that wt s C. By induction hypothesis on u, u s C.
By trivial equalities
wt[s] = (λx|B|u)[t1/x
|A1|
1 · · · tn/x
|An|
n r1/α1 · · · rk/αk]t[s]
= (λx|B|u)t[t1/x
|A1|
1 · · · tn/x
|An|
n r1/α1 · · · rk/αk][s]
= u[t/x|B|][t1/x
|A1|
1 · · · tn/x
|An|
n r1/α1 · · · rk/αk][s]
= u[s]
Then by u[s] = wt[s] and saturation (prop. 12), wt s C.
8. If it is a ∨I rule, say left (the other case is symmetric), then w = 〈True, u, d|C|〉, A = B∨C
and Γ ⊢ u : B. So, w = 〈True, u, d|C|〉 and hence π0w[s] = True. We indeed verify that
u s B with the help of induction hypothesis.
9. If it is a ∨E rule, then
w = if p0u then (λx
|B|w1)(p1u) else (λx
|C|w2)(p2u)
and Γ ⊢ u : B ∨ C, Γ, x : B ⊢ w1 : D, Γ, y : C ⊢ w2 : D, A = D.
Assume p0u[s] = True. By inductive hypothesis u s B ∨ C. Therefore, p1u s B.
Hence
w[s] = (λx|B|w1)p1u[t1/x
|A1|
1 · · · tn/x
|An|
n r1/α1 · · · rk/αk][s]
= w1[p1u/x
|B|][t1/x
|A1|
1 · · · tn/x
|An|
n r1/α1 · · · rk/αk][s]
= w1[p1u/x
|B| t1/x
|A1|
1 · · · tn/x
|An|
n r1/α1 · · · rk/αk][s]
= w1[p1u/x
|B|][s]
By induction hypothesis, w1[p1u/x
|B|] s D. Thus, by w1[p1u/x
|B|] = w[s] and satura-
tion (prop. 12), also w s D.
Symmetrically, if p0u[s] = False, we obtain again w s D.
10. If it is the ∀E rule, then w = ut, A = B[t/ατ ] and Γ ⊢ u : ∀ατB. So, w = ut. Let
v = t[s]. By inductive hypothesis u s ∀αB and so uv s B[v/ατ ]. Since ut[s] = uv[s],
by saturation (prop. 12), we conclude that ut s B[t/α
τ ].
11. If it is the ∀I rule, then w = λατu, A = ∀ατB and Γ ⊢ u : B (with ατ not occurring free
in the formulas of Γ). So, w = λατu, since α 6= α1, . . . , αk. Let t : τ be a closed term of
T ; by saturation (prop. 12), it is enough to prove that wt = u[t/ατ ] s B[t/ατ ], which
amounts to show that the induction hypothesis can be applied to u. For this purpose,
we observe that, since α 6= α1, . . . , αk, for i = 1, . . . , n we have
ti s Ai = Ai[t/α
τ ]
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12. If it is the ∃E rule, then
w = (λατλx|B|t)(π0u)(π1u)
Γ, x : B ⊢ t : A and Γ ⊢ u : ∃ατ .B. Assume v = π0u[s]. Then
t[v/ατ π1u/x
|B|] s A[v/α
τ ] = A
by inductive hypothesis, whose application being justified by the fact, also by induction,
that u s ∃α
N.B and hence π1u s B[v/α
τ ]. We thus obtain byw[s] = t[π0u/α
τ π1u/x
|B|][s]
and saturation (prop. 12) that
w s A
13. If it is the ∃I rule, then w = 〈t, u〉, A = ∃ατB, Γ ⊢ u : B[t/ατ ]. So, w = 〈t, u〉; and,
indeed, π1w = u s B[π0w/α
τ ] = B[t/ατ ] since by induction hypothesis u s B[t/α
τ ].
By saturation we conclude the thesis.
14. If it is the induction rule, then w = λαNRuvα, A = ∀αNB, Γ ⊢ u : B(0) and Γ ⊢ v :
∀αN.B(α) → B(S(α)). So, w = λαNRuvα. We have to prove that wu s B[u/α] for all
closed normal form u of type N. Let n = u[s] be the normal form of u[s]: then n is a
numeral by the Lemma 2. A plain induction on n shows that
wn = Ruvn s B[n/α]
for u s B(0) and vi s B(i) → B(S(i)) for all numerals i by induction hypothesis. If
we set i = n, the thesis follows by saturation and wu[s] = wn[s].
15. If it is a Post rule, then w = u1⋒u2 ⋒ · · ·⋒un and Γ ⊢ ui : Ai. So, w = u1 ⋒u2 ⋒ · · ·⋒un.
First, suppose that, for i = 1, . . . , n, ui[s] = Ui and w[s] = U . By induction hypo-
thesis, doms(Ui) ∩ dom(s) = ∅, and thus also doms(U) ∩ dom(s) = ∅. Suppose now
that U = ∅; then we have to prove that A[s] = True. It suffices to prove that
A1[s] = A2[s] = · · · = An[s] = True. We have U1 = · · · = Un = ∅ and by induc-
tion hypothesis A1[s] = · · · = An[s] = True, since ui s Ai, for i = 1, . . . , n.
16. If it is the excluded middle axiom EM, then w realizes EM by proposition 16.
17. If it is the Skolem axiom SK, then w realizes SK by proposition 17.
◭
As corollary of the Adequacy theorem 18, we obtain the main theorem.
 Theorem 19. If A is a closed formula such that HAω + EM+ SK ⊢ t : A, then t  A.
4 Witness Extraction with Interactive Realizability
In this section, we turn our attention to the witness extraction problem for Π02-formulas.
Given a realizer t  ∀xN∃yNPxy, where P is an atomic recursive predicate, one is asked to
extract from t a non-trivial program taking as input a numeral n and yielding as output a
witness for the formula ∃yNPny (that is, a numeral m such that Pnm = True). In the case
of Interactive realizability, the problem of computing that witness can be reduced to finding
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a “zero” for a suitable term u of type U, that is a state s such that u[s] = ∅. Indeed, given
any numeral n and state s, the following implications hold:
t  ∀xN∃yNPxy
=⇒
t s ∀x
N∃yNPxy
=⇒
tn s ∃y
NPny
=⇒
π0(tn)[s] = m ∧ π1(tn) s Pnm
=⇒
π1(tn)[s] = ∅ =⇒ Pnm = True
Therefore, if s is a zero of π1(tn), then π0(tn) is equal in the state s to some witness m of the
formula ∃yNPny. Intuitively, a zero for π1(tn) represents a sufficient amount of information
to compute the required witness. Indeed, a zero for π1(tn) always exists, because π1(tn)
represents an update procedure (see [2, 7] for investigations of the concept).
 Definition 20 (Avigad’s Finite Update Procedures). A k + 1-ary typed update procedure
k ∈ N is a term U : (N → N)k → U of T such that the following holds:
1. for all sequences f = f0, . . . , fk of closed type-N → N terms of T
Uf 6= ∅ =⇒ Uf = {(i, n,m)} ∧ 0 ≤ i ≤ k
2. for all sequences f = f0, . . . , fk and g = g0, . . . , gk of closed type-N → N terms of T and
for all 0 ≤ i ≤ k, if
Uf = {(i, n,m)}
for all j < i, fj = gj
gi(n) = m
then: Ug = {(i, h, l)} =⇒ h 6= n.
If U is a k + 1-ary update procedure, a zero for U is a sequence f = f0, . . . , fk of closed
type-N → N terms of T such that Uf = ∅.
Condition (2) describes learning by levels. If U is a k-ary update procedure and f is a
sequence of terms approximating the Skolem functions Φ0, . . . ,Φk (and we assume i ≤ j,
implies lev(Φi) ≤ lev(Φj)), there are two possibilities: either f is a fine approximation and
then Uf = ∅; or f is not and then Uf = {(i, n,m)}, for some numerals n,m: U says the
term fi should be updated as to output m on input n. Moreover, if Uf = (i, n,m), one in
a sense has learned at level i that Φi(n) = m on grounds of the values of fj, for j < i: by
definition of update procedure, if g is a function sequence agreeing with f in its first i − 1
elements, gi is another candidate approximation of Φi and gi(n) = m, then Ug does not
represent a request to modify the value of gi at point n, for Ug = {(i, h, l)} implies h 6= n.
Condition (2) indicates that the information Φi(n) = m should be preserved, unless some
information in the lower levels changes.
For technical convenience we now add to T (and thus to system TClass), a constant
ch : U → U which chooses exactly one element from every non-empty update and maps the
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empty update to itself. Therefore, we assume to have in T conversion rules such that for
every non-empty update U
ch∅ 7→ ∅ chU 7→ {(i, n,m)}, for some (i, n,m) ∈ U
For simplicity, we are going to consider only proof-like terms of TClass: a term t is said to be
proof-like if: i) every occurrence in t of the constant mkupd is of the form mkupdi, where
i is some numeral, and Φi occurs in t; ii) no update constant different from ∅ occurs in t.
Indeed, that is the syntactic form of every interactive realizer extracted from some proof in
HAω + EM+ SK.
 Proposition 21 (The Update Procedure Associated to an Atomic Realizer). Let Q be an
atomic formula of LClass and suppose t  Q, with t proof-like. Let without loss of generality
Φ0, . . . ,Φk the list of all Skolem function constants of t ordered by levels: if i ≤ j, then
lev(Φi) ≤ lev(Φj). Define
U := λf N→N0 . . . λf
N→N
k . ch(t[f0/Φ0 . . . fk/Φk])
Then U is an update procedure.
Proof. Fix two sequences f = f0, . . . , fk and g = g0, . . . , gk of closed type-N → N terms of
T . The property that Uf = {(i, n,m)} implies 0 ≤ i ≤ k is guaranteed by the fact that t is
proof-like: the only update constants that can show up in any reduction of Uf are generated
by some mkupdi with i ≤ k. Assume now Uf = {(i, n,m)}, i ≤ k, for all j < i, fj = gj,
gi(n) = m and Ug = {i, h, l}. We must show that h 6= n. Let, for simplicity, A(x, y) the
formula associated to Φi and a be the complexity of A (thus, a = lev(Φi)). Define
fˆ := λxNλyN. if x ≤ k then fx(y) else 0
gˆ := λxNλyN. if x ≤ k then gx(y) else 0
Since t  Q and
ch(t[fˆ ]) = Uf = {(i, n,m)} ∈ t[fˆ ]
by definition of realizability we obtain Afˆ (n,m) = True and
Afˆ (n, fˆi(n)) = A
fˆ (n, fi(n)) = False
Furthermore, since gˆi(n) = gi(n) = m and
ch(t[gˆ]) = Ug = {(i, h, l)} ∈ t[gˆ]
by definition of realizability we obtain Agˆ(h,m) = False. Now, for the sake of contradic-
tion, suppose h = n. Since the constants Φ0, . . . ,Φk are ordered by the complexity of the
associated formula and for all j < i, fj = gj , we have that gˆ ≡ fˆ lev(a). Thus we obtain by
proposition 8
True = Afˆ (n,m) = Agˆ(h,m) = False
a contradiction.
◭
From now on, the term U of proposition 21 will be called the (k+1)-ary update procedure
associated to t. There is a standard way to compute a zero for any update procedure and
thus for the correspondent atomic realizer. In order to do that, if f = f0, . . . , fk is a sequence
of terms of type N → N and U is an update constant, we define a term f ⊕U which changes
the values of fi according to the triples (i, n,m) ∈ U , where i = minU , leaves fj for j < i
unchanged and changes every fj , with j > i, to be equal to the constant function λx
N0.
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 Definition 22 (Updates of Functions). For each numeral i, we define a term ⊕i : (N →
N)→ U → (N → N) as follows:
⊕i := λf
N→NλuUλxN if minu > i then fx else if minu = i then (getu i x fx) else 0
We shall write t1⊕it2 in place of ⊕it1t2. If f = f0, . . . , fk is a sequence of terms of type
N → N and u : U, we define f⊕u := f0⊕0u, . . . , fk⊕ku.
 Theorem 23 (Zero Theorem). Let Q be an atomic formula of LClass, suppose t is a proof-
like term such that t  Q and let U be the (k+ 1)-ary update procedure associated to t. Let
s be any state. Define, by induction on n, a sequence {rn}n∈N of k + 1-ary sequences of
type-N → N terms as follows:
r0 := s0, . . . , sk
rn+1 := rn⊕(Urn) (see definition 22)
Then, there exists a n such that t[(rn)0/Φ0 . . . (rn)k/Φk] = ∅.
Proof. The proof that for some n, Urn = ∅, is standard (see [2, 7]).
◭
Using the results of [3], we are even able to extract a program belonging to system T .
 Theorem 24 (Program Extraction via Interactive Realizability). Let t be a term of TClass and
suppose that t  ∀xN∃yτPxy, with P : N → τ → Bool closed term of system T . Then:
1. From t one can effectively define a recursive function f such that for every numeral n,
f(n) : τ is a term of system T such that Pn(f(n)) = True.
2. f can be represented in system T .
Proof. 1. Let
v := λmN π1(tm)
v is of type N → U. Since for every numeral n
vn  Pnπ0(tn)
by the zero theorem 23, there exists a recursive function zero from the set of numerals
to the set of states such that vn[zero(n)] = ∅ for every numeral n. Define the function
f := w 7→ π0(tw)[zero(w)]
and fix a numeral n. By unfolding the definition of realizability with respect to zero(n),
we have that
tn zero(n) ∃y
τPny
and hence
π1(tn) zero(n) Pn(f(n))
that is to say
vn[zero(n)] = ∅ =⇒ Pn(f(n)) = True
and therefore
Pn(f(n)) = True
which is the thesis.
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2. The result is proven in Aschieri [3]. In particular, it follows from the fact that one can
compute in system T a zero for every update procedure and therefore for every atomic
realizer. Thus the function zero can be represented in T . In [6] there is a more efficient
algorithm, based on the technique of constructive forcing.
◭
Remark 1. The function f described in theorem 24, point 1, reduces the problem of
finding a witness to the formula ∃xτPnx to the problem of computing a zero of the atomic
realizer
vn := π1(tn)
This latter problem is solved by f by considering the update procedure U associated to vn
and computing the sequence
r0 := s0, . . . , sk
rn+1 := rn ⊕U(rn)
until a m is found such that U(rm) = ∅. The translation of f in a term of system T ,
which exists by theorem 24, point 2, yields the very same algorithm. The crucial fact is that
the number n can be computed directly in system T and thus the iteration that allows to
compute rn can be expressed by the primitive recursor of T . For details see [3].
Remark 2. We observe that our algorithm for witness extraction is not at all the last
word on the topic, for it is not particularly optimized for real-world execution. However,
thanks to our realizability interpretation, we have now achieved a sharp understanding
and control of the learning process which is implicit in every computational interpretation
of classical logic. This is crucial: the inefficiency of the algorithms extracted from classical
proofs is usually due to their inability to backtrack without forgetting important information
that they have acquired during the computation. It is already evident that dramatically
more efficient algorithm are possible, by managing in a more sophisticated way the update
of the states. For example, multiple updates of the states can be allowed at one time and
in the proof of the Zero theorem one does not need to “set to zero” every approximation
corresponding to a Skolem function of higher level of the first level which is corrected by an
update. For reasons of space, we leave these important optimizations to future work.
References
1 F. Aschieri, S. Berardi, Interactive Learning-Based Realizability for Heyting Arithmetic with
EM1, Logical Methods in Computer Science, 2010.
2 F. Aschieri, Transfinite Update Procedures for Predicative Systems of Analysis, Proceedings
of Computer Science Logic, 2011.
3 F. Aschieri, A Constructive Analysis of Learning in Peano Arithmetic, Annals of Pure and
Applied Logic, 2011, doi:10.1016/j.apal.2011.12.004.
4 F. Aschieri, S. Berardi, A New Use of Friedman’s Translation: Interactive Realizability,
Festschrift of Helmut Schwichtenberg, Ontos-Verlag Series in Mathematical Logic, to ap-
pear.
5 F. Aschieri, Learning Based Realizability for HA + EM1 and 1-Backtracking Games: Sound-
ness and Completeness, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic, to appear.
6 F. Aschieri, Interactive Realizability for Second-Order Heyting Arithmetic with EM1 and
SK1, preprint, http://hal.inria.fr/hal-00657054/fr/
F. Aschieri 27
7 J. Avigad, Update Procedures and 1-Consistency of Arithmetic, Mathematical Logic
Quarterly, volume 48, 2002.
8 F. Barbanera, S. Berardi, A Symmetric Lambda-Calculus for Classical Program Extraction,
Information and Computation, 1996.
9 S. Berardi and U. de’ Liguoro, Interactive Realizers. A New Approach to Program Extraction
from Nonconstructive Proofs, ACM Transactions on Computational Logic, 2012.
10 T. Coquand, A Semantic of Evidence for Classical Arithmetic, Journal of Symbolic Logic,
1995.
11 H. Friedman, Classically and Intuitionistically Provable Recursive Functions, Lecture Notes
in Mathematics, 1978, Volume 669/1978, 21-27.
12 K. Gödel, Uber eine bisher noch nicht benutzte Erweiterung des finiten Standpunktes, Dia-
lectica 12, pp. 280-287 (1958).
13 G. Gentzen, Die Widerspruchsfreiheit der reinen Zahlentheorie. Mathematische An-
nalen,1935.
14 J.-Y. Girard, Proofs and Types, Cambridge University Press (1989).
15 G. Kreisel, On Weak Completeness of Intuitionistic Predicate Logic, Journal of Symbolic
Logic, vol. 27, 1962.
16 J-L. Krivine, Typed lambda-calculus in classical Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, Archive for
Mathematical Logic, 40(3), 2001.
17 G. Mints, S. Tupailo, W. Bucholz, Epsilon Substitution Method for Elementary Analysis,
Archive for Mathematical Logic, volume 35, 1996
18 M. H. Sorensen, P. Urzyczyn, Lectures on the Curry-Howard isomorphism, Studies in Logic
and the Foundations of Mathematics, vol. 149, Elsevier, 2006.
19 A. Troelstra, D. van Dalen, Constructivism in Mathematics, vol. I, North-Holland, 1988.
